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Implicated Presuppositions
1 Introduction
Presuppositions are an important means to structure information. They allow
speakers to communicate more than one proposition with a single sentence, and
furthermore indicate which of the propositions communicated is the main asser-
tion and which provide a background for the main assertion. For example, (1)
entails both that John has been smoking since yesterday, and that he had been
not smoking for some time until yesterday.
(1) John began smoking yesterday.
The analysis of presuppositions that is currently standard is, for example, pre-
sented in textbooks by Heim and Kratzer (1998) and, more extensively, Kadmon
(2001). This account holds that presuppositions are modelled semantically as
truth value gaps with a set of special pragmatic rules that tell us how to link
these truth-value gaps to the common ground (Stalnaker 1973, 1978). Within
this model, the lexical entries of certain words, the presupposition triggers like
the change of state verb begin in (1), contain as part of their lexical entry the
fact that they trigger a presupposition and what the content of this presupposi-
tion is. Technically, this is marked by indicating the domain of the function that
captures the meaning of a word separate from its truth-conditional contribution.
In the following, I use a notation using fractions, where the statement above the
fraction bar describes the domain and that below the fraction bar the value is
given. This is illustrated by the lexical entry for begin in (2):
(2) [[begin]] = λP λx x did not P in the past
x is doing P at present
Heim and Kratzer (1998) instead use a notation where the domain condition and
the value are given on a single line separated by dots, which is of course fully
equivalent. The advantage of the fraction notation is that it is more transparent.
Onthestandardanalysisofbegin,thelexicalentryencodesboththecontentof
its presupposition and its presuppositionality. The content of the presupposition
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of begin distinguishes it from continue, which in difference to begin entails that
the present state already held in the past. The presuppositionality of the speciﬁc
part of content distinguishes (2) from the lexical entries in (3) where presuppo-
sition and assertion are switched in (3a), while (3b) has no presupposition.
(3) a. [[begin ]] = λP λx x is doing P at present
x did not do P in the past
b. [[begin  ]] =λP λx x did not do P in the past∧x is doing P at present
Clearly analyses of presuppositions that place less of a burden on the lexicon
are preferable. One such proposal is in essence due to Heim (1991). She argues
that the a non-uniqueness presupposition of the indeﬁnite article is not inherent
in its lexical entry, but instead is derived in a fashion analogous to implicatures.
My goal in this paper is to argue that this proposal should be extended to a
number of cases other than the indeﬁnite article. Heim’s concern is to explain
facts like the oddness of (4).
(4) #A father of the victim arrived at the scene.
To this end, Heim (1991) proposes a theoretical revision of the proposal of
Hawkins (1981) based on scalar implicature. Since the deﬁniteness presuppo-
sition of the is not informative, Heim proposes that a new version of the quantity
maxim of Grice be formulated that applies to presuppositions. This she then uses
to derive the effect in (4).
1.1 Abusch’s Proposal
Heim’s proposal is not the only, ﬁrst, or most ambitious attempt to derive pre-
suppositions or presuppositionality. Stalnaker (1974) already presents a proposal
for the derivation of the presuppositionality of the factive entailment of know.
An important recent paper by Abusch (2005) discusses Stalnaker’s proposal and
some related ones, as well as making a new proposal. However, as I argue in this
section, even Abusch’s proposal faces a problem.
Abusch assumes that certain lexical entries are associated with a set of alter-
natives. Speciﬁcally, she propose that the pairs in (5) are alternatives.
(5) a. {stop, continue}
b. {win, lose}
c. {be right, be wrong}
d. {know, be unaware}
On the basis of these lexical alternatives, Abusch deﬁnes an alternative sentence
as in standard alternative semantics (Hamblin, 1973): An alternative sentence
there is derived from the original sentence by one or more replacements of one
lexical item of one of the sets in (5) with an element of its alternative set. For
example, a sentence with know is assigned the alternative set in (6b).Implicated Presuppositions 3
(6) a. x knows p
b. {x knows p, x is unaware p}
Finally, Abusch assumes that the disjunctive closure of the alternative set is al-
ways presupposed. In this way, she derives from (6a) the presupposition p as the
disjunction in (7), assuming here that x is unware that p is equivalent to (p and
x doesn’t believe p).
(7) (p and x believes p)o r( p and x doesn’t believe p)=p
Further applications of Abusch’s idea to stop and win are shown in (8). The dis-
junctive statements in (8b) and (9b) paraphrase in each case the presupposition
Abusch’s proposal predicts and we can verify easily that these predictions are
correct.
(8) a. Jan stopped smoking at three.
b. Jan stopped smoking at three or he continued smoking at three. ↔
Jan was smoking until three.
(9) a. Jan won.
b. Jan won or Jan lost. ↔ Jan participated.
However, Abusch’s proposal runs into problems with cases that contain more
than one presupposition trigger. Consider the example in (10):
(10) Jan stopped winning.
Example (10) clearly presupposes that Jan won in the past. For example, this
entailment is preserved in the question (11a) and the negated version (11b).
(11) a. Did Jan stop winning?
b. Jan didn’t stop winning.
Abusch’s proposal, however, predicts that the presupposition of (10) to be the
disjunction of the four alternatives in (12). These alternative are formed by re-
placing either one or both presupposition triggers in (10) with one of their lexical
alternatives.
(12) a. Jan stopped winning.
b. Jan continued winning.
c. Jan stopped losing.
d. Jan continued losing.
The disjunction of the four sentences in (12) can be paraphrased as the presup-
position that John participated in the past. This is evident if we spell out the
lexical meanings of the presupposition triggers as in (13), where for simplicity I
assume that winning means coming 1st and losing means coming last.4 Uli Sauerland
(13) a. Jan came ﬁrst in the past, but not this time.
b. Jan came ﬁrst in the past, and also this time.
c. Jan came last in the past, but not this time.
d. Jan came last in the past, and also this time.
The presupposition Abusch’s proposal predicts is therefore too weak because
of the interaction of the two alternative sets. An overly weak prediction is also
predicted by Abusch’s proposal in other examples containing two presupposition
triggers. Consider abstractly the case of two presupposition triggers p + q and
a+b occurring in a sentence S. Assume furthermore that the alternative to p+q
is p+q  to predict presupposition p and the alternative of a+b is a+b  to predict
presupposition a. Then, if two triggers occur in a single sentence, the predicted
presupposition is the disjunction in (14).
(14) S(p+q)(a+b)∨S(p+q )(a+b)∨S(p+q)(a+b )∨S(p+q )(a+b )
Consider just the special case that S is additive in both argument positions.1
Then the most problematic term is the last alternative, S(p+q)(a+b ), because
this only has the entailment S(p)(a) in common with the assertion – in (13), it is
also the last term, (13d) that is most problematic. Hence, the predicted presup-
position on Abusch’s proposal is S(p)(a), rather than S(p+q)(a)∧S(p)(a+b)
as predicted by the standard theory of presuppositions.
But of course, there are ways to repair the proposal. Speciﬁcally, Abusch
(p.c.) suggests assuming that the presuppositions from the alternative set are
computed whenever one presuppositional items is encountered. This would en-
sure that never more than one presupposition trigger is considered in the same
alternative sets, and would therefore avoid the problem just mentioned. The dis-
cussion here illustrates, however, that it is not easy to predict presuppositions
while only making use of standard semantic and pragmatic notions such as the
alternative set in the way familiar from question and focus semantics.
2 Implicated Presuppositions
The idea of an implicated presupposition is that it is derived exactly like an im-
plicature, but in the presuppositional domain. The relevant type of implicature
for the following is scalar implicatures (Horn, 1972). Examples of scalar impli-
catures are (15) and (16), where the implicature is indicated in (15b) and (16b).
(15) a. The Philharmonic played some of Beethoven’s symphonies.
b. They didn’t play all nine.
(16) a. I saw Tom or Jim at the airport.
b. I didn’t see both Tom and Jim at the airport.
1 I.e. S(p + q)(a + b)=S(p)(a) ∧ S(p)(b) ∧ S(q)(a) ∧ S(q)(b) for all p,q,a,b.Implicated Presuppositions 5
For the following, I assume that scalar implicatures are derived from the ﬁrst
maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), and that the conditions on alternative sets are
as proposed by Horn (1972, 1989). Speciﬁcally, I assume the alternative sets in
(17). The scalar alternatives determine which assertions compete:
(17) a. {some, all}
b. {or, and}
To derive the scalar implicatures in (15) and (16), I assume that the Gricean
maxims obligate a speaker to select the most informative assertion of those con-
taining a scalar item, or one of its alternative that the speaker believes to be true.
This corollary can be summarized as (18):
(18) Make your contribution the most informative one of those you believe
to be true.
This account predicts that the speaker uttering (15a) and (16a) does not believe
the more informative alternatives with all and and. This is still weaker than the
implicatures stated above, which say that the speaker believe that the stronger
alternatives are false. However, I ignore this issue here (see Sauerland (2004b))
since it will not be relevant.
Heim’s proposal for her account of the presupposition of a is based on an
earlier proposal by Hawkins (1981). Hawkins assumes that the and a form an
alternative set just like the two pairs in (17), and therefore predicts a scalar im-
plicature of a.
(19) {the, a}
Since Hawkins assumes the non-presuppositional, Russellian semantics of the
deﬁnite determiner, the scalar implicature predicted for indeﬁnite a is that there
be more than one. Hence, Hawkins’s proposal correctly predicts examples like
(20) to entail that the victim have more than one father.
(20) A father of the victim arrived at the scene.
Heim’s contribution is to transfer Hawkins’s account to the domain of presup-
positions. This becomes necessary if we assume a presuppositional lexical entry
for the rather than the Russellian one. Namely, if the deﬁnite presupposes exis-
tence and uniqueness, use of the and a are equally informative in any situation
where both can be used, and therefore the condition in (18) does not predict the
oddness of (20). Therefore Heim suggests the new pragmatic maxim in (21).
(21) Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible! (Heim, 1991)6 Uli Sauerland
Heim’s proposal predicts (20) to be odd as a consequence of (21): Since the
speaker does not presuppose that the victim has a unique father, the speaker
must either assume that the victim does not have a unique father or the speaker
must be violating (21). In this way, use of the indeﬁnite article generally leads
to a presupposition which is complementary to that of the deﬁnite article—a
presupposition that there not be a unique individual x satisfying the restrictor.
Heim discusses only the indeﬁnite article as an application of maxim (21).
Because of that and because the original publication was in German, Heim’s
proposal has not received much attention. In the remainder of this section, I
show that there are numerous other cases where (21) does some work. Two cases
already discussed in prior work are the non-factivity entailment of believe and
the non-plurality entailment of the plural. The non-factivity of believe explains
why (22a) is found to be slightly misleading if it was known to the speaker that
313 actually is a prime number. Generally the use of believe p suggests that p is
at least not certain.
(22) John believes that 313 is prime.
While the non-factivity of believe has sometimes been called an implicature, it
really belongs to the implicated presuppositions, if we explain by reference to
the factive presupposition of know. For this natural explanation, a sentence con-
taining know would be compared with the believe-version for the satisfaction of
condition (21). Since the version with believe satisﬁes (21) only if the factive
presupposition of know is not satisﬁed, the analysis predicts that the use of be-
lieve is only possible if the truth of its complement is not yet part of the common
ground. In this way, we derive for believe p the implicated presupposition that
the truth of p is not a common ground.
A second case of an implicated presupposition is the the non-singularity en-
tailment of the plural which was recently discussed in Sauerland et al. (2005);
Spector (2007). In short, these works argue there that a plural number does not
exclude singular reference by means of a lexical presupposition. However, a
singular does have lexical presupposition of singularity. Therefore, an impli-
cated presupposition is generated that the referent of a plural noun phrase be not
known to be singular. This entails for example (23) that, if the number of Tom’s
children is known, it must be greater than one. If the number is not known, how-
ever, Tom having just one child is not ruled out. (cf. Hoeksema 1983)
(23) Tom’s children must be well-behaved.
The epistemic property of implicated presuppositions illustrated by (23) gen-
eralizes to other implicated presuppositions. However, there are further char-
acteristic properties of implicated presuppositions that can be used to distin-
guish implicated presuppositions from implicatures on the one hand and con-
ventional presuppositions on the other. In the following subsection, I summarize
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2.1 Characteristics of Implicated Presuppositions
Implicated presuppositions are different from conventional presuppositions on
the one hand, and implicatures on the other. One property already noticed in
the previous section for the non-singularity of the plural is it’s epistemic status.
This property is attested for the non-factivity of believe, as (24) illustrates. The
speaker of (24) need not assume that it is part of the common ground that Mary
is faithful to John, but rather (24) is also felicitous in a situation where it is un-
known whether Mary actually is cheating on John or not. (24), however, similar
to (22), would be odd in a context where it is already established that Mary is
cheating on John.
(24) John believes that Mary is cheating on him.
The epistemic status of implicated presuppositions follows directly from maxim
(21), as Heim already observes in the following way. An implicated presuppo-
sition results from the existence of a pair of two sentences S and S , of which
S has a presupposition p that S  lacks. Under circumstances where maxim (21)
applies, it follows that S  can only be used when the speaker knows that p is not
satisﬁed. Speciﬁcally, if the speaker does not know whether p holds, it follows
that p is not satisﬁed. Therefore the implicated presupposition of S  is that p is
not certain.
One of the examples Heim uses to illustrate the epistemic status of the non-
uniqueness implicature of the indeﬁnite is (25), which does not say anything
about the availability of other 20 ft. long catﬁsh in the area.
(25) Robert caught a 20 ft. long catﬁsh. (Heim, 1991, (121))
The weak epistemic status of implicated presuppositions is only a necessary
criterion for being an implicated presupposition, but not a sufﬁcient one: It is
conceivable that conventional presuppositions also presuppose that something
is not certain, though I do not know of any such examples. Epistemic status,
however, is useful for deciding for a pair of lexical items with contradictory im-
plicatures which one has a conventional presupposition. Furthermore, epistemic
status distinguishes implicated presuppositions from implicatures, which gener-
ally have a stronger epistemic status (see Sauerland 2004b; Fox 2007 for recent
discussion). For example, (26a) is understood to implicate not just that the Phil-
harmonic is not certain to have played all of Beethoven’s symphonies, but rather
that they certainly did not play all of them.
(26) The Philharmonic played some of Beethoven’s symphonies.
For this reason, scalar implicatures do not follow from Gricean maxims only,
but require an additional or an entirely different mechanism. It it instructive that
this mechanism does not apply to implicated presuppositions in the same way,8 Uli Sauerland
as attested by the difference in epistemic status between scalar implicatures and
implicated presuppositions.
A second contrast between implicatures and implicated presuppositions is
their projection through negation. Implicated presuppositions, just like conven-
tionalpresuppositions,arenotaffectedbynegationunchanged.Thisisillustrated
for all three implicated presuppositions discussed up to now in (27).
(27) a. John doesn’t believe that 313 is prime.
b. I haven’t met Tom’s children.
c. Robert didn’t see a father of the victim.
The projection behavior of implicated presuppositions follows in the follow-
ing way: The conventional presuppositions of the relevant alternative sentence
project in the way known for conventional implicatures. So, for example, the
alternative of (27a) with know projects a factivity presupposition to the sentence
level. Therefore conventional presupposition of the alternative sentence is ex-
actly the same as that of the unnegated sentence. But then, it follows that the
implicated presupposition, which is derived from the conventional presupposi-
tion of the alternative is also the same as the implicated presupposition of the
unnegated sentence. In this way, it follows more generally that all implicated
presuppositions project through expressions that project conventional presuppo-
sitions unchanged.
Implicated presuppositions clearly contrast with scalar implicatures in this
way.Scalarimplicaturesarereversedinthescopeofnegationandotherdownward-
entailing operators (Atlas and Levinson, 1981; Sauerland, 2004b): The positive
sentence with some implicates the negation of the sentence with all, as seen
above, and the positive sentence with all has no scalar implicature. In contrast,
the negative sentence (28) with all implicates its negation when all is replaced
by some: Since the double negation then cancels each other out, this predicts the
implicature that the Philharmonic played some of Beethoven’s symphonies.
(28) The Philharmonic didn’t play all of Beethoven’s symphonies.
The negative sentence with an indeﬁnite, on the other hand, has no scalar impli-
cature.
(29) ThePhilharmonicdidn’tplayoneBeethovensymphony/Beethovensym-
phonies.
While in the case of negation, implicated and conventional presuppositions
projected in the same way, this is not the case for projection over a universal
quantiﬁer. Conventional presuppositions, as illustrated by the examples in (30),
project universally across a universal (Heim, 1983): (30a) presupposes that ev-
ery audience member’s support really was crucial for the team, and (30b) pre-
supposes that every student has exactly one sister.Implicated Presuppositions 9
(30) a. Every audience member knows that his support was crucial for
the team.
b. Every male student looks similar to his sister.
This is supported by the fact that it is odd to continue (30a) with But, John’s
support really wasn’t crucial or (30b) with And therefore, John looks similar to
bothofhis.Sotheuniversallyprojectedpresuppositionisnoteasilycontradicted.
Universal projection does not obtain with implicated presuppositions as the
examples in (31) show: (31a) could be continued felicitously with but only
John’s support really was, and (31b) with And therefore, John should invite his
sister.
(31) a. Every audience member believes that his support was crucial for
the team.
b. Every student should invite his sisters.
The example in (32) shows that the non-uniqueness presupposition of the in-
deﬁnite also does not project universally. Here, I imagine a scenario where sev-
eral candidates applied. Some have written only one book, others have written
more than one, and the selection committee knows exactly who has written how
many. Then the committee could decide (32b) while (32a) would be odd. (32a)
would only be acceptable if every candidate was known to have written exactly
one book or one book of each candidate was salient. (32b) on the other hand is
compatible where some of the candidates have actually written a unique book,
corroborating my claim that the relevant presupposition of (32b) could be para-
phrased as: Not every candidate has a unique book.
(32) a. #Every candidate should send his book.
b. Every candidate should send a book of his.
The difference in projection across universals between conventional and impli-
cated presuppositions follows again straightforwardly from the proposed anal-
ysis: Conventional presuppositions project universally as ∀xP(x), where P be
the presupposition. Hence, the corresponding implicated presuppositions have
the logical structure ¬∀x:P(x), or equivalently ∃x:¬P(x) – this follows in the
same way as the weak epistemic status of implicated presuppositions.
In the interaction with universals, implicated presuppositions therefore be-
have much like scalar implicatures. There might, however, be a small difference.
It has been claimed sometimes, for instance by Chierchia (2004), that a scalar
term in the scope of a universal gives rise to a stronger implicature than the
strength observed above. For example, Chierchia claims that (33a) has implica-
ture (33b) rather than (33c).
(33) a. Every student wrote a paper or did a presentation.
b. strong implicature: No student did both.10 Uli Sauerland
c. weak implicature: Not every student did both.
However, I still remain skeptical about this point as examples can easily be con-
structed where the stronger implicature does not obtain. Consider (34a), which
to my mind clearly does not implicate (34b), but rather (34c). In this case, there-
fore, implicatures behave exactly like implicated presuppositions.
(34) a. All of Bill’s relatives drink or smoke.
b. strong implicature: None of them does both.
c. weak implicature: Not every one of them does both.
Insum,thefollowingthreecharacteristicssetimplicatedpresuppositionsapart
from scalar implicatures, on the one hand, and conventional presuppositions on
the other: They must have weak epistemic status in contrast to scalar implica-
tures and conventional presuppositions, where the weak epistemic status does
not seem to be necessary. They project through negation which scalar implica-
tures do not. And they do not project universally through a universal quantiﬁer
unlike conventional presuppositions. Finally, I should note that I will return to
the issue of how implicated presuppositions project in Section 3; while I consid-
ered in this section the projection across negation and universals, there I consider
projection across presupposition ﬁlters.
2.2 Further Evidence
Five other cases of implicated presuppositions are the non-uniqueness and non-
duality of universal quantiﬁers, the non-imperative presupposition of the French
subjunctive, the non-past presupposition of the present tense, and the various
presuppositions of nominal and pronominal agreement features. 2
Consider ﬁrst the case of the English universal quantiﬁer every. English uni-
versals have both a non-uniqueness and a non-duality presupposition3, which
explain why the two sentences in (35) are odd.
(35) a. #Every nose of Kai’s is runny.
b. #Every cheek of Lina’s is rosy.
Thenon-uniquenessandnon-dualitypresuppositionsfollowfromHeim’smaxim
(21) since the sentences in (36) presuppose more: (36a) presupposes that Kai has
a unique nose, and (36b) presupposes that Lina has two cheeks.
2 Amsili and Beyssade (2006) discusses an interesting sixth case: the distinctness constraint on
subject reference in coordinated sentences like (ia), which do not contain any explicit marker of
parallelism (cf. (ib) which contains too). This case is particularly interesting because the impli-
cated presupposition applies in a sentence not containing any trigger.
(i) a. ∗?John is sick and Mary is sick.
b. John is sick and Mary is sick, too.
3 Kazuko Yatsushiro (p.c.) has reminded me of the latter, also noting that it is weaker than the
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(36) a. The nose of Kai’s is runny.
b. Both cheeks of Lina’s are rosy.
Further evidence for the status of non-uniqueness and non-duality as implicated
presuppositions can be obtained from the three criteria developed in the previous
section. The weak epistemic status is evident when we consider example (37),
which does not presuppose that I will have more than two students in my next
class, but merely that such a bigger number is possible. 4
(37) Every student in my next class will have to work hard.
Projection across negation of the non-uniqueness and non-duality presupposi-
tions is clearly shown by the two examples in (38).
(38) a. #His father didn’t wipe every nose of Kai’s.
b. #Her father didn’t cream up every cheek of Lina’s.
Finally, example (39) shows that neither the non-uniqueness nor the non-duality
presupposition project universally when in the scope of another universal. Con-
sider here a scenario that is a slight variant of the one for example (32): Several
candidates applied. Some have written only one paper, others two, and the rest
have written more than two. In this scenario neither non-uniqueness nor non-
duality is satisﬁed for every candidate, but (39) is nevertheless acceptable.
(39) Every candidate should send every paper of his.
The French subjunctive is discussed in detail by Schlenker (2005). He ar-
gues that it is the semantically unmarked form in French verbal morphology.
One speciﬁc point, he argues, is that it has an implicated presupposition of non-
imperativity. This provides an explanation for the facts in (40) and (41). In the
second person singular (40a), the subjunctive cannot be used with an imperative
interpretation, and also no other interpretation is available for (40a), which is
therefore odd. This, Schlenker explains by reference to the imperative form in
(40b).
(40) a. #Que
That
tu
you
sois
be-SUBJ
prudent!
cautious
4 Interesting to consider here are examples where numerosity one or two is presupposed, but it is
uncertain whether the actual numerosity is one or two. The prediction of Heim’s analysis is that
every should be possible in this case, if singular the and both both presuppose exactly the nu-
merosity one or two respectively. The cases in (i), in my judgement, corroborate this prediction:
(i) a. Eagles lay one or two eggs each summer. The researcher has permission to
study every egg of this eagle this summer.
b. John will either look at one or both sides of the sheet. Every side he looks at,
he will initial.12 Uli Sauerland
b. Sois
Be-IMP
prudent!
cautious
Directevidenceforthisproposalcomesfromexample(41),whichshowsthatthe
subjunctive is compatible with an imperative interpretation in general. Speciﬁ-
cally, the generalization Schlenker draws is that the subjunctive can have an
imperative interpretation if and only if the imperative form of the same person
class is morpho-syntactically blocked.
(41) Que
That
votre
your
Altesse
Highness
soit
be-Msubj
prudente!
cautious!
In this case the argument for an implicated presupposition is of a different type
than those sketched above for indeﬁniteness and other categories. Namely, in
this case the argument is based on the fact that, when the form with stronger
presuppositions is blocked for independent reasons (in the case of (41) this is
presumably for morpho-syntactic reasons), the weaker form must be used even
in examples like (41). In this way, the semantically unmarked form emerges
under blocking.
Two other cases of implicated presuppositions, I have discussed in other
places in some detail: tense (Sauerland, 2002) and φ-features (Sauerland et al.,
2005; Sauerland, 2006). Concerning tense, I argue that the English present tense
should be viewed as semantically vacuous, but as giving rise to a non-pastness
presupposition. That non-pastness is an implicated presupposition I show, for
example, by means of the contrast in (42): (42a) must talk about only past Tues-
days, but (42b) would usually talk about present and non-present Tuesdays. This
is exactly the difference between universal projection of the conventional past
presupposition in (42a) and non-universal projection of the implicated non-past
presupposition in (42b).
(42) a. Every Tuesday, I fasted.
b. Every Tuesday, I fast.
Concerning φ features, I argue that person, number and gender features all have
semantically vacuous unmarked values. For person, the unmarked value is third
person (cf. Benveniste 2006), for number it is plural (Sauerland et al., 2005) and
for gender it differs among languages (Sauerland, 2006). In this case, too, my
argument is based on the non-universality of projection and the epistemic status
of the presupposition, as well as from blocking as in the French subjunctive (41)
above.
3 Implementation
The previous section has provided evidence for the existence of a class of impli-
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this section, I focus on the mechanisms that derive these implicated presupposi-
tions. I ﬁrst show that what initially seems to me to be the most straightforward
implementation faces problems with presupposition ﬁlters, as Percus (2006) dis-
covered. I then go on to present a different solution to this problem from Percus’s
solution where I make use of Schlenker’s (2007) approach to presupposition and
projection.
Heim (1991) proposes maxim (21) with an explicit note that her proposal
is to be only taken to indicate a direction for future research. A full proposal
needs to say more speciﬁcally from what set of alternatives the one with maxi-
mal presuppositions must be selected. Here the examples in the previous section
provided some information. For example, we assumed that a sentence with a has
the sentence with the instead of a as an alternative to derive the non-uniqueness
implicature of a. Evidently though, it is not any other sentence or even every par-
tial proposition is an alternative to a sentence S: So, while (43c) is an alternative
for (43a), it cannot be an alternative for (43b) since the use of (43c) is felicitous
in the context of (43), even though the presupposition of (43b) asymmetrically
entails (43c).
(43) The victim’s father arrived wearing pyjamas.
a. #A father of the victim identiﬁed his son.
b. The father of the victim who was wearing pyjamas identiﬁed his
son.
c. The father of the victim identiﬁed his son.
Another observation regarding the non-uniqueness implicated presupposition of
the indeﬁnite is that, in cases like (44a) the most direct alternative (44b) is
hardly grammatical in English. Instead the more compact (44c) is preferred.
At this point, the theory could either say that ungrammatical alternatives are
sometimes considered or could allow (44c) as an alternative. While I follow the
former line below, I know of no good evidence bearing on this choice.
(44) a. #A father of John’s arrived.
b. ∗?The father of John’s arrived.
c. John’s father arrived.
More informative even is the case of every: To derive the non-uniqueness and
non-duality presuppositions of every we have to assume that it has as alterna-
tives the and both. This shows that the alternatives need not be identical. Since
both combines with the plural, while every combines with the singular, we fur-
thermore assume that both singular and plural variants of the NP can occur in the
set of alternatives relevant for presupposition maximization. This in itself is not
surprising, since I also referred to arguments that the plural and singular gener-
ally are alternatives to each, but the example tells us something else: Standardly,
it is assumed that semantically contentful number marking does not occur on14 Uli Sauerland
the determiner itself, but in some other position of the DP (see Heycock and
Zamparelli 2005; Sauerland 2003 for recent proposals). Therefore the interac-
tion of alternatives with a different determiner and different number shows that
alternatives cannot be deﬁned solely as one morpheme change.
At this point there are still many ways to understand the set of underlying al-
ternatives. From my perspective, a straightforward mechanism would be an ex-
tension of the mechanism I proposed for scalar implicatures (Sauerland, 2004b).
There I argued for a view of scalar implicatures as derived from alternative sen-
tences based on sets of lexical sets. The ones relevant for this paper are shown
in (45):
(45) Scales: {the, every, a, both}, {believe, know}, {SING, PLUR},
{SPEAKER,HEARER}, {PRESENT, PAST},...
Using these sets of lexical alternatives, I deﬁne a set of alternative sentences as
in (46):
(46) Alt(S) = {S  | the only differences between S and S  are replacements
of one member of one of the sets in (46) with another element of the
same set}
Now the maxim (21) could be spelled out as in (47). In order to block S, and
thereby lead to an implicated presupposition, an alternative must satisfy three
conditions: its presuppositions must be satisﬁed, as (47a) states; it must be true
according to the speaker, as (47b) states; and it must have more informative
presuppositions than S, as (47c) states.
(47) MaximizePresupposition(preliminaryversion):DonotuseSincontext
set c if there is an S  such that:
a. c ⊂ domain([[S]]  )
b. you believe S  to be true
c. domain([[S’]]) ⊂ domain([[S]])
While this proposal seems straightforward, Percus (2006) shows that the pro-
posal has a problem with presupposition ﬁlters.5 The contrast Percus (2006)
discusses is (48). This contrast is not explained by the principle in (47) because
(48a) and (48b) have the same presuppositions. Speciﬁcally, both does not con-
tribute to the global presupposition of (48a) because a universal with restrictor
R and scope S projects only the presupposition ∀xR (x) → S(x) (Heim, 1983).
For (48a), this only amounts to the tautology that everyone who has exactly two
students has exactly two students, and therefore (48a) is deﬁned for exactly the
same possible worlds that (48b) is deﬁned for.
5 In the classiﬁcation of presupposition projection properties of words by Karttunen and Peters
(1979), holes are recognized as a category of presupposition absorbing operators. However, I do
not believe that this category actually has any members (cf. Heim 1992). If there were any, they
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(48) (Percus, 2006, (30))
a. Everyone with exactly two students assigned the same exercise to
both of his students.
b. #Everyone with exactly two students assigned the same exercise to
all of his students.
However, the contrast in (48) is one that we would expect the right account of
implicated presuppositions to predict, since it is a contrast between both and all.
Therefore, Percus correctly argues that the proposal in (47) is not satisfactory as
an account of implicated presuppositions.
The same point can be made with other presupposition ﬁlters and other im-
plicated presuppositions as the examples in (49) and (50) show. In (49b), the
ﬁlter is a conditional clause and the trigger of the implicated presupposition is
believe. In (50b), the ﬁlter is a conjunction and the trigger is an indeﬁnite. In
both cases, proposal (47) predicts no implicated presupposition because the al-
ternatives in (49a) and (50a) do not possess a stronger presupposition since the
presuppositions introduced by the lexical alternatives of believe and the indeﬁ-
nite respectively are ﬁltered out.
(49) a. If it was raining, John would know that it’s raining.
b. #If it was raining, John would believe that it’s raining
(50) a. He has only one daughter and his daughter is very young.
b. #He has only one daughter and a daughter of his is very young.
Percus’s discovery shows that proposal (47) conceives the comparison mech-
anism underlying implicated presuppositions wrongly. That proposal (47) com-
pares only the presuppositions of two complete sentences makes it too global to
capture the effect in examples (48) through (50).
Percus adopts a proposal he attributes to Schlenker (2005) that conceives of
the comparison mechanism as applying purely locally: at the level of a lexical
item. Percus introduces the notion of a lexical item being presuppositionally
stronger than another. This notion derives ordered lexical scales rather than the
unordered sets of lexical alternatives above. For the presupposition triggering
items relevant in this paper, the lexical scales Percus would derive in this way
are the ones in (51), where the presuppositionally stronger item is always shown
on the left.
(51) Scales: the,a , both,every , the,every , both,all , the,all , know,
believe , SING, PLUR , +SPEAKER,-SPEAKER , +HEARER,- HEARER ,
 PAST, PRESENT ,...
Using these lexical scales, Percus formulates the Maximize Presupposition Prin-
ciple in a completely local manner in (52). The only difference is the comparison
clause (52c), which now deﬁnes the comparison as purely local.16 Uli Sauerland
(52) Maximize Presupposition (á la Percus 2006): Do not use of S in context
set c if there is an S  such that:
a. c ⊂ domain([[S]]  )
b. you believe S  to be true
c. S  is derived from S by a single or multiple replacements of one
item of a scale with another item higher on the same scale
While this proposal achieves better empirical coverage, it does so at the cost
of sacriﬁcing the analogy between scalar implicatures and implicated presuppo-
sitions. The Schlenker-Percus proposal closely resembles the proposal by Horn
(1972) and Gazdar (1979) for scalar implicatures. They propose that lexical
scales are ordered and that scalar implicatures are essentially derived by replac-
ing one scalar item with the next stronger item on the same scale and negat-
ing the result. Following Atlas and Levinson (1981), I have criticized this kind
of proposal on the basis of the interaction of scalar implicatures with negation
(Sauerland, 2004b). Consider the examples in (53). When the scalar item many
occurs in a positive sentence, the scalar implicature predicted by replacing many
with all is correct, giving rise to the implicature that Tina didn’t know all of the
people there. With many in the scope of negation as in (53b), however, the same
algorithm would predict wrongly the implicature that Tina knew all of the peo-
ple there. The intuitively correct implicature, that Tina knew a couple of people
there, results in this case by replacing many with the next weaker item on its
scale, a couple, and then negating the result.
(53) a. Tina knew many of the people there (but not all).
b. Tina didn’t know many of the people there (but only a couple).
This shows that for scalar implicatures the comparison should not be completely
local in the way it is in (52). This would be an interesting difference between
scalar implicatures and implicated presuppositions; one, that ought to be inves-
tigated more closely to see whether it is real and what it stems from. However,
as long as presuppositions and assertions are two separate properties of lexical
items, the difference between presuppositions and implicatures can be stated as
above. Percus’s explanation of his observation would therefore support the lexi-
cal separation of presupposition and assertion and argue against recent proposals
that argue against this separation such as Schlenker (2007). I return to this matter
below, but ﬁrst note an empirical problem with (52).
Since presuppositions project unless they are ﬁltered, it is difﬁcult to make an
empirical case against the Schlenker-Percus proposal along the lines of the cases
in (53). One small empirical problem, however, arises with the derivation of the
non-duality implicatureofeveryillustrated by(54a), whichis repeatedhere from
(35). As noted above, the natural alternative to derive non-duality from is (54b).
But, (54b) is derived from (54a) by two changes: replacement of every with both
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of the two goes in the direction from a lower to a higher item on the presup-
positionality scale. The replacement of SING with PLUR, however, goes in the
opposite direction: the presupposition-less PLUR is replaced with the presuppo-
sitionally stronger SING. Therefore, this is unexpected from the perspective of
the Schlenker-Percus maxim (52).
(54) a. #Every cheek of Lina’s is rosy.
b. Both cheeks of Lina’s are rosy.
While this problem may be solvable, consider now the difference between im-
plicated presuppositions and scalar implicatures within the recent proposal of
Schlenker (2007), that aims to remove the lexical difference between presuppo-
sition and assertion. Schlenker assumes a strictly bivalent logic and therefore no
semantic distinction between presupposition and assertion. The account of pre-
suppositions he proposes is entirely pragmatic and has two parts: Division and
Be Articulate. Division derives that the meanings of some lexical items have two
parts, one of which is called the pre-condition. For example, Schlenker assumes
that the lexical meaning of know is λpλx.p ∧ believe(x,p). Division derives that
the meaning of know is conceived of having two parts corresponding to the two
parts: thepreconditionλpλx.pand thesecond partλpλxbelieve(x,b). Schlenker
distinguishes the precondition by underlining such that know can be written as
pq. By convention, p stands for a lexical item that has the same interpretation as
the precondition p. A second convention is that the notation pq is taken to entail
that the presupposition is non-trivial. Schlenker does not, at this point, provide a
full theory of how division takes place and I will also leave it at that.
Division feeds into the principle Be Articulate as formulated in (55). The
intuition behind this principle is that a speaker must not say too many things at
the same time: generally instead of the divisible pq it is preferable to say p and
pq.
(55) Be Articulate! (cf. Schlenker 2007, (2)) If p and (p)q can be uttered
felicitously in a syntactic context α β, α [p and (p)q] β is preferable
to αp qβ .
Consider (56a) as an application of (55). (55) states that (56b) must be used
instead of (56a) unless (56b) cannot be uttered felicitously. One major class of
caseswhere(56b)cannotbeusedfelicitouslyarethosewheretheﬁrstconjunct—
that Mary is cheating on John—is already part of the common ground. This de-
rives that (55a) can be used when the presupposition—now in a non-technical
sense—that Mary is cheating on John is part of the common ground. A differ-
ence between Schlenker’s account and standard presupposition theory is that it
so far does not necessarily derive that (56a) can only be used when the presuppo-
sitionissatisﬁed:ifthereareothercircumstancesinwhich(56b)isnotfelicitous,
(56a) might be useable under those circumstances (a prediction Schlenker 200618 Uli Sauerland
endorses). In the following, I only consider the case of the more articulate (56b)
being infelicitous because of the redundancy of the ﬁrst conjunct.
(56) a. John knows that Mary is cheating on him.
b. Mary is cheating on John and John knows it.
As Schlenker formulates Be Articulate! in (55), he leaves it open whether
(56a) is compared with (56b) or (57). In (57), in contrast to (56b), the factive
precondition is not expressed in the second conjunct. However, (57) is pragmati-
cally odd. In fact, (57) is analogous to Percus’s example showing the interaction
between presupposition ﬁlters and implicated presuppositions above.
(57) #Mary is cheating on John and John believes it.
However, since Schlenker does not assume a lexical distinction between pre-
supposition and assertion, implicated presuppositions are predicted by his pro-
posal as normal scalar implicatures assuming appropriate scales. For example,
if believe and know form a scale, (58a) implicates that the sentence (58a) with
know instead of believe should be false. A complication at this point is that the
sentence with know, if asserted, would need to satisfy Be Articulate and, since
Schlenker shows that his proposal predicts standard assumptions about presup-
position projection, the sentence with know could only be asserted when it is part
of the common ground that Mary is cheating on John. But, then the negated al-
ternative with know would contradict the asserted positive sentence with believe.
But, if we assume that Be Articulate does not apply internally, (58b) is predicted
as an implicature of (58a).
(58) a. John believes that Mary is cheating on him.
b. It is not certain that Mary is cheating on John.
This will be generally the case when we consider q when there is an alternative
pq and they are not embedded below another logical operator.
In the case of (57), however, the conﬂict between the assertion and the impli-
cature is unresolvable. The implicature derived from (57) by replacing believe
with know, and negating the result is (59). But, (59) and (57) are equivalent. Be-
cause of this conﬂict between assertion and implicature, (57) is predicted to be
odd.6
(59) It is not the case that Mary is cheating on John and he knows it.
6 Cancellability of implicatures might seem to be a problem for this analysis. But, the logical
contradiction arises already from the epistemically weaker implicature that it is not certain that
Mary is cheating on John and he knows it, and it has been observed that such epistemically weak
implicatures (primary implicatures in the terminology of (Sauerland, 2004b)) are very hard if not
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However, I argued in section 2.1 that implicated presuppositions differ from
scalar implicatures in two areas: the projection from below negation and the
weak epistemic status. I here consider just the former. Look at example (60a),
which has the implicated presupposition that it is not part of the common ground
that Mary is cheating on John. 7 In this case, however, the implicature predicted
is the negation of (60a) with know instead of believe. Since the double negation
cancels out, and the part of know that entails belief contradicts the assertion, the
predicted implicature is (60b)—exactly the opposite of the desired result.
(60) a. John doesn’t believe that Mary is cheating on him.
b. It is certain that Mary is cheating on him.
Unless this result can be traced back to the theory of implicatures I have
assumed, (60a) is a clear problem for the account investigated here. At this point,
it seems necessary to postulate a new maxim, (61), to account for implicated
presuppositions within Schlenker’s.
(61) Maximize Redundancy If pq and q can uttered felicitously in a syntactic
context α β, αp qβis preferable to αqβ
3.1 Conclusion
In sum, I have shown in this paper that there is a distinct category of implicated
presuppositions that is separate from scalar implicatures and conventional pre-
suppositions. In the last section, I have considered various theoretical proposals
to account for implicated presuppositions. I have shown that ultimately a sepa-
rate principle (61) may be necessary to account for implicated presuppositions.
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